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Los ANGELES COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
OFFICE IN PERSPECTIVE
NANCY ALBERT-GOLDBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article offers some preliminary insights into the structure and
operations of the Los Angeles County Public Defender agency
(LACPD). The research began with several on-site interviews and in-
court observations by the author in November 2006 and August 2007.
The Public Defender and his Chief Deputy were gracious in providing
statistical reports produced for their budgetary requests to the county
board. They also provided useful auxiliary materials such as the
agency's Policies and Procedures Manual and the California State Bar
Association's Guidelines on Indigent Defense Services Delivery
Systems.1 In addition, the agency made a senior trial attorney available
to walk the author through the court system and answer specific
questions.
The author also examined the LACPD's website,2 speeches
delivered by the Public Defender, and media coverage of the agency. 3
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, and private
practitioner. Her previous posts include: President, National Defender Institute;
Defender Director for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association; and Project
Director for the National Study Commission on Defense Services, a two-year
comprehensive study of indigent defense services utilizing thirty-five commissioners
and a research staff conducted under a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration of the U.S. Department of Justice. The author wishes to thank Paul
Caprara and the other editors of the law review for their thoughtful comments and
suggestions.
1. THE STATE BAR OF CAL., GUIDELINES ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES
DELIVERY SYSTEMS (2006) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA STATE BAR STANDARDS].
2. Welcome to the Los Angeles County Public Defender, http://pd.co.la.ca.us/
(last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
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Subsequently, Professor Laurence Benner, who directed the 2006-
2007 statistical survey of California public defense agencies, supplied
the author with statistical data collected from some of the L.A. County
defender offices.4
The article pinpoints some key features germane to public
defender agencies and to the LACPD system in particular. Part II
delves into the public's perceptions, or misperceptions, of lawyers
who are paid by the government while serving the indigent accused.
Part III is a statistical overview of the agency, including: total cases
handled, size of staffing, number of offices, salaries, and so forth. Part
IV describes the significance of LACPD's role as an "institutional
agency" and the ways in which that role enhances and/or detracts from
its ability to provide zealous, effective representation for the accused.
Part V examines the methods used by LACPD's attorneys to dispose
of cases, including the high rate of plea bargains and alternative
dispositional approaches such as pretrial diversion. Part VI looks at an
issue that some believe to be the crux of the problem-the inability of
public defenders to begin representation early enough in the process.
Others believe that the principal failing of public defender agencies is
the problem addressed in Part VII-the lack of sufficient staffing to
devote enough time to each defendant. Part VIII highlights an issue
often overlooked in establishing defender agencies-the lack of
adequate training for lawyers emerging from law school with little or
no previous experience in the specialized practice of defending
criminal cases. The article concludes with some general observations
that highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the nation's largest
public defender agency, the LACPD office. 5
3. See infra notes 51, 53, and 55.
4. See Laurence A. Benner, The Presumption of Guilt: Systemic Factors That
Contribute to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CAL. W. L. REV.
263 (2009).
5. This "case study" is based on short-term observations and limited data;
therefore, the conclusions and recommendations contained in this report are
tentative. A formal evaluation conducted by a research team would allow more
definitive conclusions to be reached. For example, a Justice Department-funded
research team led by a Ph.D. social scientist prepared an evaluation design, which
has since been employed in a number of defender agency evaluations. See ROBERTA
ROVNER-PIECZENIK ET AL., EVALUATION DESIGN FOR THE OFFICES OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER (National Legal Aid and Defender Association 1976).
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II. THE IMAGE QUESTION
Public defenders in L.A. County are caught in a familiar dilemma.
They recognize that they have an "image problem." The Chief Public
Defender highlights it on the agency's website,6 alluding to the
frequently asked question: "Are Deputy Public Defenders real
lawyers?" To which he replies with a resounding, "Absolutely!,
7
While seeking to portray the program as a "law office" for the
poor, the Public Defender promotes the advantages of the agency's
role as an "institutional" program.8 The LACPD constantly grapples
with the conundrum of serving two seemingly opposing
constituencies-indigent clients accused of crime and a county
government that finances both prosecution and defense of the accused.
The LACPD agency operates in the midst of a sharply divided
community of haves and have-nots, of Beverly Hills mansions
inhabited by the super-rich and humble East L.A. ghetto abodes where
residents are besieged by rampant gangland assassinations. There is a
public perception, whether warranted or not, that privileged
individuals like O.J. Simpson with the means to hire their own "dream
team ' 9 of private lawyers can get away with murder while the poor
may be railroaded off to prison, guilty or not, due to substandard legal
assistance.
Is there a two-tiered, unequal, criminal justice system in L.A.
County, one for the poor and another for the wealthy? It is a
complicated question.
The structure that houses the agency's main suite of offices is, in
itself, somewhat off-putting. The massive L.A. County criminal courts
building sits in the heart of downtown Los Angeles. Half-a-dozen
6. Welcome to the Los Angeles County Public Defender, supra note 2.
7. Los Angeles County Public Defender, Frequently Asked Questions-
Getting a Lawyer, http://pd.co.la.ca.us/F-getlawyer.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
8. See CALIFORNIA STATE BAR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 7-8.
9. See Joel Achenbach, O.J. Simpson's Defensive Lineman, WASH. POST, Jan.
21, 1995, at DI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A99139-1995Jan21.html ("'If this was anyone other than Mr. Simpson, represented
by Johnnie Cochran, you could say, gee, this seems like a slam dunk,' says Peter
Arenella, a UCLA law professor who has followed the case closely.").
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homeless people occupy benches on the sidewalks surrounding it. The
early 1970s edifice is an unadorned, box-like structure.
Carved into the side of a hill, the building's three entrances
present visitors with disparate introductions to the Los Angeles
criminal justice system. Public defender clients and others who find
themselves at the southern facade are obliged to enter at their own
risk. A sign announcing "Public Entrance" stands at the base of a
steep set of rusting iron and concrete riser-less staircases that are as
formidable and precarious as the criminal justice system itself.
Fortunately, entrances on the north and west sides are considerably
more accessible, although the public's awareness of their existence is
left to chance.
Inside, the lobby is devoid of benches. Visitors are herded along
by armed security guards manning conveyor belts where the
belongings of all save police personnel are examined and x-rayed.
Upstairs, the LACPD agency's headquarters provides a more
welcoming atmosphere. The LACPD's waiting room is equipped with
comfortable seating and staffed by a friendly, helpful bilingual
receptionist.
The LACPD's downtown offices are situated directly above the
District Attorneys' suite. Likewise, outside Los Angeles city limits,
most L.A. County public defender offices are housed inside
courthouses. Their proximity to judges and prosecutors compounds
the public defender's image problem. Clients of the agency tend to
identify defender office lawyers with those actors who hold sway over
the premises. They view public defenders with an understandable
skepticism-could someone who is part of the "system" be trusted to
safeguard their right to a fair trial? The clients' concerns are unlikely
to be assuaged were they to learn that the Chief Public Defender for
L.A. County is, like public defenders in many U.S. jurisdictions,
selected and hired by the county government.' 0 The program's current
10. A survey of indigent defense programs that are financed with state funds
was conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, in
1999. Of the programs surveyed, nineteen of the twenty-one were public defender
programs as opposed to programs involving the appointment of private counsel to
represent indigent defendants. According to the report:
Unlike their chief prosecutor counterparts who are primarily elected, the
chief public defenders were appointed in all 19 States. In eight States the
[Vol. 45
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director was selected by five members of the County Board of
Supervisors. l l Future chief defenders will be selected by the county's
Chief Executive Officer.
12
When asked by the author whether the agency might be better
served by a location outside the confines of the courthouse, Chief
Deputy Public Defender Robert Kalunian reasoned, "The location
presents an image problem because our clients must be subjected to
governor appointed the chief public defender; in seven States, an
independent board or commission made the appointment; and in the
remaining four States, judges, the program advisory-board, the board of
trustees, or the corporate board of directors [made the appointment].
CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATE-FUNDED INDIGENT DEFENSE
SERVICES (2001), available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/sfids99.txt. A 1982
national survey of criminal defense systems reported that "in Florida, elected public
defenders operate separately in each of the 20 judicial circuits in the State." BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, A NATIONAL SURVEY: CRIMINAL
DEFENSE SYSTEMS (1984) (emphasis added). However, election of public defenders
is the exception rather than the norm. While the 1999 survey was limited to defender
systems that are state-funded, the 1982 survey was more comprehensive in that it
included defender systems financed by all levels of government. The final report for
the 1982 survey concluded: "Most States organize indigent defense services on a
county level." ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG ET AL., NATIONAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE
SYSTEMS STUDY: FINAL REPORT 9 (Abt Associates Inc. ed. 1986).
11. Interview with Robert Kalunian, Chief Deputy Pub. Defender, Office of the
L.A. County Pub. Defender, in L.A., Cal. (Aug. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Kalunian,
Aug. 21, 2007 Interview].
12. Id.; see also THE NAT'L STUDY COMM'N ON DEFENSE SERVS., GUIDELINES
FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, FINAL REPORT (National
Legal Aid & Defender Association 1976) [hereinafter NATIONAL STUDY
COMMISSION] (recommending that chief defenders be selected by a nonpartisan
Public Defender Commission with no single branch of government having a
majority of votes). The National Study Commission's Guideline 2.10 provides: "A
special Defender Commission should be established for every defender system,
whether public or private." Id. at 506. According to the L.A. County Charter, the
Public Defender is an "appointive county officer." L.A. County Charter art. IV, sec.
14. In addition, California Government Code section 27702 provides: "At the time
of establishing the office the board of supervisors shall determine whether the public
defender is to be appointed or elected." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27702 (West 2008).
The District Attorney, on the other hand, is an elective officer. L.A. County Charter
art. IV, sec. 12. There are serious drawbacks to election of public defenders. See
Scott Wallace & David Carroll, The Implementation and Impact of Indigent Defense
Standards, 31 S.U. L. REV. 245, 260-61, n.27 (2004).
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weapons screening, but that is offset by the convenience of our being
so accessible to the courtrooms. Convenience outweighs the other
factors."'1
3
The most positive thing one can say about the courthouse is that it was
renamed in 2002 after a remarkable woman, Clara Shortridge Foltz.
Born in 1849, Foltz moved to California in the early 1870s, several
decades before California women gained the right to vote. 14 When she
decided to pursue a career in the law, the State of California did not
yet require law school attendance as a prerequisite to becoming a
lawyer, but it did require applicants to be white males.' 5 She
successfully shepherded an amendment through the California
legislature to replace "white male" with "person," and in 1878 became
the first woman admitted to the California bar.
16
Later, after becoming the first female Deputy District Attorney in
Los Angeles, she recognized the need for an organized program
devoted to the specialized practice of representing indigent suspects in
criminal cases. 17 Due to her persistent efforts over a period of years,
L.A. County established a public defender office in 1913.18 It was the
13. Interview with Robert Kalunian, Chief Deputy Pub. Defender, Office of the
L.A. County Pub. Defender, in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Kalunian,
Nov. 21, 2006 Interview]. The National Study Commission's Guideline 2.7
provides: "Local defender offices should be located near the appropriate
courthouses, but never in such proximity that the defender offices become identified
with the judicial and law enforcement components of the criminal justice system.
Defender offices should maintain interview and waiting rooms in the courthouse."
NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 506.
14. Women's suffrage in California was approved by male voters in 1911. See
Women of the West Museum, California Women Work for Wages, Votes, and
Visibility, http://www.autrynationalcenter.org/explore/exhibits/suffrage/suffrage-ca.
html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009); see also Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge
Foltz: "First Woman," 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 1231, 1234-40 (1994).
15. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 275 (Deering 1871) (originally passed in
1851); see also Babcock, supra note 14, at 1246.
16. Babcock, supra note 14, at 1246, 1261.
17. See Susan L. Brandt, Patience Milrod, & Mortimer D. Schwartz, Clara
Foltz: Pioneer in the Law, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 545, 556-58 (1976).
18. See id.; Los Angeles County Public Defender, History of the Office,
http://pd.co.la. ca.us/ History.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
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very first public defender organization, both for California and for the
nation as a whole. 19
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE AGENCY: FACTS AND FIGURES
The LACPD system, which serves the nation's most populous
county, is the largest defender agency in the United States.2' The
county itself contains over ten million individuals residing in eighty-
eight cities as well as many unincorporated areas. 21 Forty-four U.S.
states each contain populations smaller than this single county.22
LACPD handles approximately 70% of felony and 55% of
misdemeanor cases prosecuted in the county. 23 Its caseload includes
roughly 90,000 felony, 400,000 misdemeanor, and 40,000 juvenile
cases each year.24 It also provides representation for some 12,000
persons in mental health commitment proceedings as well as a variety
of other matters. Over half of the LACPD's misdemeanor caseload
consists of traffic charges prosecuted by the City Attorney rather than
the District Attorney. These charges range from simple matters such
as driving on a suspended license to DUI and serious hit and run
violations. The LACPD office does not provide representation in non-
jailable charges classified as "infractions. 25
19. See Los Angeles County Public Defender, History of the Office, supra note
18.
20. PUB. POLICY INSTITUTE OF CAL., JUST THE FACTS: Los ANGELES COUNTY
(2005), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTFLACountyJTF.pdf.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The Office of the Pub. Defender, County of L.A., Public Defender Internal
Statistics (Jan. 2007) (unpublished internal memorandum on file with author)
[hereinafter Internal Statistics Memo].
24. Id.
25. See Kalunian, Nov. 21, 2006 Interview, supra note 13 (noting that his
office is obligated to provide representation for the indigent accused in all
misdemeanors, including traffic cases where the law does not provide for a jail
sentence, unless the law classifies the traffic offense as an "infraction"); Internal
Statistics Memo, supra note 23. An infraction is "[a] violation, usu. of a rule or local
ordinance, and usu. not punishable by incarceration." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
796 (8th ed. 2004).
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The majority of LACPD's approximately $165 million budget
comes directly from the county.26 In addition, the county funds a
separate agency, the L.A. County Alternate Public Defender's office,
to represent individuals whom the Public Defender's office is barred
from defending due to a conflict of interest.27 Due to California court
rulings, office policy prevents L.A. County defenders from
representing more than one defendant in a multiple defendant case.
28
The Alternate Public Defender office handles a relatively small
portion-about 15%--of the county's indigent felony cases.29
Over 700 courtroom lawyers are employed by LACPD, which has
offices in thirty-nine locations scattered throughout the county.30 By
law, none of these attorneys are permitted to engage in private legal
practice.31 This prohibition eliminates the possibility of misperception
by clients that their lawyer's private clients might be receiving
preferential treatment. Moreover, Deputy Public Defenders are strictly
prohibited from accepting any funds from their indigent clients. 32
In 2007, salaries of Deputy Public Defenders ranged from
$58,000 for beginning attorneys, to $141,000 for trial attorneys
26. Internal Statistics Memo, supra note 23.
27. Kalunian, Aug. 21, 2007 Interview, supra note 11; see also CAL. PENAL
CODE § 987.2(d)-(e) (West 2008).
28. See People v. Mroczko, 672 P.2d 835, 836-37 (Cal. 1983); see also CAL.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310 (2008); LAw OFFICES OF THE PUB. DEFENDER,
COUNTY OF L.A., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES No. A-5 (2002) [hereinafter LACPD
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES].
29. Telephone Interview with Robert Kalunian, Chief Deputy Pub. Defender,
Office of the L.A. County Pub. Defender (Aug. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Kalunian, Aug.
2, 2007 Telephone Interview].
30. Los Angeles County Public Defender, Services, http://pd.co.la.ca.us/Servic
e.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
31. L.A. County Charter art. XII, sec. 55; see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27705
(West 2008).
32. See LACPD POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 28, No. A-2 ("No
attorney employed by this Department shall charge, request or receive for his own
use any fee, reward or payment of any kind from any person . . . other than the
County of Los Angeles for any services rendered by him .... Employees of the
Public Defender found to be in violation of this policy will be subject [to] discharge
from County service.").
452 [Vol. 45
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qualified to handle death penalty cases.33 Young lawyers joining the
LACPD become Civil Service employees who can expect to climb a
four-step career ladder if they meet expectations for quality
performance.34
LACPD is under-budgeted when it comes to investigative staff.
There are only eighty-four investigators serving more than 700
courtroom lawyers. 35 LACPD staff also includes twenty-seven
psychiatric social workers who work primarily on juvenile matters.36
A portion of the eighty-four investigators works exclusively on
juvenile cases.37 In addition, the agency employs paralegals to assist in
preparing sentencing and mitigation recommendations.38
Some innovative programs have been established through the use
of grants and other pools of separate funds. For example, the LACPD
started a program whereby social workers locate services for homeless
persons. 39 The LACPD is also involved in a variety of special projects
geared to the needs of mentally ill adults, juveniles with various
mental disorders, individuals suffering from drug or alcohol addiction,
victims of domestic violence, and the developmentally disabled.4 °
LACPD has the use of over 1,100 networked computers.41
However, due to funding limitations, the agency has experienced
hardware and software problems that remain unresolved.
33. Internal Statistics Memo, supra note 23.
34. Id.; see also Kalunian, Aug. 21, 2007 Interview, supra note 11 (discussing
the pros and cons of the civil service system).
35. Internal Statistics Memo, supra note 23; see also NATIONAL STUDY
COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 513 (recommending a ratio of one investigator for
every three staff attorneys in the National Study Commission's Guideline 4.1).
36. Internal Statistics Memo, supra note 23.
37. Kalunian, Aug. 21, 2007 Interview, supra note 11.
38. Id.
39. See The Office of the Public Defender, County of L.A., Special Projects of
the Public Defender (unpublished report on file with author) [hereinafter Special
Projects].
40. One such grant received in 1999-2000, Client Assessment Recommendation
Evaluation (CARE), employed social workers in gang violence cases to assess
whether certain juvenile offenders represent a risk to the community. The social
workers identified needed services and made recommendations for dispositional
plans. Special Projects, supra note 39, at 8.
41. Internal Statistics Memo, supra note 23.
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The Civil Service status of defender office employees has its
advantages-employees gain a certain amount of insulation from
improper political influences in hiring and promotion. On the flip side,
the system slows the process of firing employees for poor
performance. Employees cited as needing improvement gain a six-
month window of time to upgrade their skills, and then, if rated
unsatisfactory afterwards, can request a hearing before the Civil
Service Commission.4 2 Chief Deputy Public Defender Robert
Kalunian believes that, on balance, civil service protection is
beneficial, despite the fact that it limits his authority as an
administrator.43 Attorneys whose performance does not measure up
are "placed where they can do the least harm," according to
Kalunian.44
IV. ROLE AS AN "INSTITUTIONAL AGENCY"
The central question is, given the fact that the Public Defender
Office is accountable to county government, have the lawyers working
in the agency surmounted that obstacle by becoming effective,
independent advocates for the indigent accused as required by
constitutional and state bar mandates? Further, what are the pros and
cons of the agency's position as an "institutional" defender office?
The agency is currently headed by Michael Judge, a well-
seasoned lawyer with strong leadership and administrative skills.45 His
mission statement for the agency focuses on providing the highest
quality legal representation to its clients and facilitating improvements
in the criminal justice system that offer long-term benefits to those
clients. 46
While recognizing the need to provide services at the lowest
possible cost to taxpayers, Judge has spoken out in instances where
the cards appear to be stacked against the poor in criminal cases. He
42. Kalunian, Nov. 21, 2006 Interview, supra note 13.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Los Angeles County Public Defender, History of the Office, supra note 18.
46. Los Angeles County Public Defender, Mission Statement, http://pd.co.la.c
a.us/Mission.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
454 [Vol. 45
10
California Western Law Review, Vol. 45 [2008], No. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol45/iss2/5
2008] L.A. COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE IN PERSPECTIVE 455
complained publicly about the fact that court approval is required to
obtain experts on behalf of indigent clients while the District
Attorney's Office has an internal budget to hire outside experts as well
as access to a vast array of forensic and law enforcement resources.47
His conclusion: "This . . . method of providing criminal defendants
with expert assistance too often fails to deliver the quality of expertise
actually needed," leaving the case with "little more than window
dressing."48
One of the advantages of an "institutional" public defender
agency is its ability to effect system-wide change by correcting abuses
in the criminal justice system. For example, in 2006-2007, the agency
began to address the prosecution's failure to turn over exculpatory
evidence to the defense in a number of cases. The LACPD office
launched a strategy that promises to result in court rulings forcing the
District Attorney's office to comply with Brady v. Maryland, a
landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision establishing a constitutional
duty on the part of the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence to
the defense that is material to questions of guilt, innocence, or
sentencing.49
In October 2007, the LACPD launched an investigation into a
series of arrests allegedly resulting from a five city competition among
sheriff's deputies to book as many suspects as possible during a
twenty-four hour period.5 ° According to the Chief Public Defender,
the arrests may not have been prompted by what the deputies saw, but
47. See Michael P. Judge, L.A. County Pub. Defender, Expert Access: Without
Appropriate Resources, Lawyers Cannot Provide an Adequate Defense (on file with
author). National standards recommend separate defender office budgets for hiring
experts. See, e.g., NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
AND GOALS, TASK FORCE ON THE COURTS Standard 13.14 (1973) [hereinafter
NAC]; NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 12; see also CALIFORNIA STATE
BAR STANDARDS, supra note 1, Part VIII (recommending that indigent defense
providers should enjoy parity with prosecutors in access to experts and forensic
labs).
48. Judge, supra note 47.
49. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 89 (1963).
50. See Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Sheriff's Arrests to be Investigated-Public
Defender's Office Plans Challenges to Cases Stemming From a Contest Aug. 15 at
the Lakewood Station Geared to Boost Deputies' Productivity, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2007, at BI.
11
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rather by the pressure of producing greater arrest numbers for the
competition. 5
1
The LACPD office also played a proactive role when it
spearheaded an investigation of corrupt police practices, in what came
to be known as the "Rampart Scandal." The Scandal was so named
because the corrupt police officers belonged to an anti-gang unit
attached to the Police Department's Rampart Division located just
west of downtown Los Angeles.52
Deputy public defenders were reporting a pattern of client
complaints of police planting evidence and/or using excessive force.
When defenders demanded information regarding witnesses to the
alleged misconduct, police responded with protective orders
preventing disclosure of witness information, falsely claiming that the
protective orders had been issued by the court.53
Revelations of the falsified protective orders necessitated a review
of an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 cases to determine whether
defendants might have been convicted based on trumped-up
evidence.54 The LACPD's office created a special unit, Public
Integrity Assurance Section (PIAS), to investigate cases involving
alleged police misconduct.55
At first, the District Attorney's office resisted cooperating in the
investigation. As evidence of police involvement in framing suspects
mounted, prosecutors joined the LACPD's office in seeking to set
aside wrongful convictions. The prosecution eventually filed criminal
charges against the crooked officers. The LACPD's effectiveness in
correcting the injustices discovered in the Rampart debacle is a prime
example of an "institutional" defender office's ability to serve as a
counterweight to abuse in the criminal justice system.
51. Id.
52. See NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Law & Order (PBS broadcast Feb. 9,
2000) (report by Jeffery Kaye of KCET, Los Angeles), online transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-juneOO/lapd_2-9.html.
53. Id.
54. See Jarrett Murphy, L.A. Must Review 20,000 Cases, CBS NEWS, Aug. 10,
2000, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2000/08/l0/national/main223748.shtml?sour
ce=search-story.
55. See Kalunian, Nov. 21, 2006 Interview, supra note 13.
456 [Vol. 45
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V. How DEFENDERS DISPOSE OF CASES
Many lawyers seeking to pursue a career in criminal defense work
see public defender service as the purest form of practice, since it
allows them to focus on legal issues rather than monetary issues.
When asked why he chose to become a public defender, a level three
attorney in the L.A. office replied, "I knew I wanted to become a
criminal defense lawyer while I was still in law school. I like standing
up for the little guy. Trials are the most interesting part of the job-
you get an adrenaline rush." 56
Despite the typical public defender's love of trial work, the vast
majority of cases are settled through plea-bargaining. Because there
are so few trials, LACPD office administrators estimate the average
cost per case for handling a felony, including death penalty cases, to
be less than $722. 57 Misdemeanors cost the public far less-about
$150 per defendant. Additionally, juvenile services cost the LACPD
roughly $403 apiece, while mental health matters were somewhat
more expensive, running about $460 each.58 Only about 5% of
LACPD felony cases and 3% of its misdemeanor cases result in a
trial.59
The reasons for the high rate of plea bargains vary. In general,
prosecutors offer incentives to the accused that make pleading guilty
very attractive, while simultaneously wielding the weapon of a more
severe penalty should the defendant lose at trial. 60 Defendants may
also feel pressured to plead in cases where the prosecution has
charged them with a felony offense when a misdemeanor charge
would have been more appropriate.
California's bail bond system places additional pressure on
defendants to plead guilty. Unless a defendant is able to post 10% of
the bail amount, arrestees must pay bondsmen non-refundable fees to
56. Interview with Level III Attorney, Office of the L.A. County Pub.
Defender, in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 21, 2006) (interviewer promised confidentiality to
interviewee).
57. Internal Statistics Memo, supra note 23.
58. Id.
59. Kalunian, Aug. 21, 2007 Interview, supra note 11; Internal Statistics
Memo, supra note 23.
60. See People v. Segura, 188 P.3d 649, 655 (Cal. 2008).
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gain their release.61 Incentives to plead guilty are increased in minor
charges because arrestees often gain immediate release by pleading
guilty at arraignment.
The LACPD makes an effort to provide "vertical representation"
in felony cases. 62 Their goal is to have a single attorney assigned to
represent a given defendant throughout every stage of the proceedings,
commencing with the preliminary hearing. However, in practice, the
objective is not always carried out. For example, if the main attorney
is on trial in another case, a pool of lawyers assigned to the
preliminary hearing calendar handles that stage of the proceedings.
The rationale for providing vertical representation is that it helps to
establish a rapport between attorney and client, and the continuity of
counsel assures better coordination of all aspects of the case. 63
In November 2000, California voters decided it was cheaper to
provide short-term treatment for nonviolent drug offenders than to
maintain them in the prison system. 64 They approved Proposition 36,
the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, a law that
became effective in mid-2001. 65 Between 2001 and 2006, 140,000
drug offenders received treatment instead of incarceration, and over
40% of them successfully completed their treatment. 66 Researchers
estimated that the law reduced the number of people in state prison for
drug possession by 32%, saved taxpayers the cost of building a new
state prison, and resulted in the closing of a women's prison. 67
The Public Defender's Office is part of an effort to cast a still
wider net in the effort to rehabilitate addicts and return them to
61. See Kalunian, Nov. 21, 2006 Interview, supra note 13.
62. Id.
63. The Public Defender agency received a $72,000 grant from the State Office
of Criminal Justice Planning for the year July 1999 through June 2000, titled
"Vertical Defense of Indigents," that aided LACPD in its effort to provide vertical
representation. See Kalunian, Nov. 21, 2006 Interview, supra note 13; Kalunian,
Aug. 21, 2007 Interview, supra note 11.
64. Feature: Five Years On, California's Proposition 36 Claims Success, But
Faces New Struggles, DRUG WAR CHRONICLE, Mar. 10, 2006,
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle-old/426/prop36.shtml.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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productive membership in society. A trial court judge, using his
authority as a sentencing judge, organized a program in his courtroom
with the help of the Public Defender and District Attorney.68 The
Sentenced Offender Drug Court program (SODC) takes drug
offenders convicted of serious non-drug offenses, such as nonviolent
thefts and commercial burglaries committed to feed their drug habit,
and funnels them into an eighteen-month treatment and rehabilitation
program.
69
At the time of the author's visit, a Deputy Public Defender, who
was also a credentialed nurse, conducted preliminary screenings of
defendants to assess the likelihood that they could succeed in drug
rehabilitation. 70 A Deputy District Attorney made his own assessment,
and the judge made the final determination of a defendant's eligibility
for SODC. Participants are required to spend three-and-a-half months
in a jail-based treatment program and then graduate, in three stages,
with the help of the IMPACT drug treatment facility.7 1 Participants
report back to court monthly while in custody.72
The SODC program has reportedly produced dramatic results,
with up to three-quarters of the participants succeeding in drug
68. Judge Michael Tynan, in Department 113 of the Los Angeles Superior
Court, organized this program, which uses the facilities of the IMPACT Drug and
Alcohol Treatment Center. See Interview with Level III Attorney, supra note 56.
69. A Deputy Public Defender, who is also a nurse, stated that defendants
accepted to the program are facing prison time. Her criteria for admitting defendants
to the program are: no weapons; defendant is charged with nonviolent theft or
commercial burglary; and defendant must agree to spend three and a half months in
jail. She accepts defendants who have failed in Proposition 36 drug diversion
programs, but does not accept drug dealers. She does accept defendants who are on
parole; in such cases, she works with the Parole Department. Defendants are
ultimately released to a residential facility that is not locked down. In phase three,
men go to "sober living" at night and attend sessions during the day. Phase four
entails independent living, but they are still tested for drugs three times a week.
After eighteen months, they graduate. Interview with Attorney-Nurse, Office of the
L.A. County Pub. Defender, in L.A., Cal. (Nov. 22, 2006) (interviewer promised
confidentiality).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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rehabilitation.73 While this small experiment reaches but a fraction of
L.A. County's convicted drug offenders, it is noteworthy that such a
hands-on effort can flourish in a major metropolitan area.
VI. TIMELY ACCESS TO COUNSEL
California law provides that public defenders need not await
formal appointment by a judge in order to commence representation of
a client. The public defender has statutory authority to undertake
representation upon the request of an indigent defendant despite the
lack of a court appointment. 7
4
However, at the men's jail in downtown Los Angeles, one can
search in vain for placards providing information on how to contact
the public defender in advance of court appointment. While attorneys
may be called at their homes by police should a defendant request
counsel upon receiving Miranda warnings,75 this rarely happens.76
There are no regularly scheduled "duty days" in the office on
weekends or in the evenings. 77 Nor does it appear that LACPD staff
reaches out to arrestees by conducting jail screenings to identify
situations requiring immediate attention. 78
The LACPD's website does advise the public that it is possible to
speak to a Deputy Public Defender before the first court appearance
73. Id.
74. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27706 (West 2003); see also L.A. County Charter art.
VI, sec. 23; CALIFORNIA STATE BAR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 8.
75. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("Prior to any questioning,
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."); see Los Angeles County
Public Defender, Frequently Asked Questions--Can I Get Advice from a Deputy
Public Defender Before I Appear in Court?, http://pd.co.la.ca.us/F-getlawyer.html
(last visited Feb. 5, 2009) ("If the person does not waive the right to an attorney, the
police must arrange for the presence of an attorney before questioning can take
place .... The Public Defender has attorneys on call to serve [this] function[].").
76. The Office of the Pub. Defender, County of L.A., Commonly Asked
Questions and Answers (internal memorandum on file with author) [hereinafter
Commonly Asked Questions].
77. Interview with Level III Attorney, supra note 56.
78. Id.
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by calling the public defender office at the nearest courthouse or by
coming to the office in person.79 However, according to a list of
Commonly Asked Questions and Answers prepared by the LACPD,
"less than 200 arrestees a year are assisted by the Public Defender
before the initial appearance."
80
In practice, the vast majority of initial contacts with arrestees do
not take place until after arraignment. California law requires that
arrestees be arraigned within forty-eight hours, but the law makes
exceptions for days when court is not in session such as Sundays and
holidays.81 As a result, some individuals may languish in jail for close
to a week before appearing before a judge and having counsel
appointed.
Deputy defenders are required to interview arrestees before the
next court hearing. In a felony matter, the next court hearing is a
preliminary hearing that takes place about two weeks after
arraignment.82 Deputy defenders generally visit the jail to conduct an
initial interview with a defendant sometime between arraignment and
preliminary hearing.
83
It should be noted that the logistical hurdles of serving such a
large land mass as L.A. County are daunting, even with thirty-nine
office locations. However, the net effect of postponing initial contact
with counsel is that, especially in misdemeanor matters, many
arrestees are unable to mount any defense at all. As described in Part
VII below, in misdemeanor courts the accused often plead guilty at
their first appearance simply to get out of jail, regardless of whether a
legal defense exists. 84 Delays in access to counsel may result in loss of
both employment and perishable evidence necessary for one's
defense.85
79. See Los Angeles County Public Defender, Frequently Asked Questions-
Can I Get Advice from a Deputy Public Defender Before I Appear in Court?,
http://pd.co.la.ca.us/Fgetlawyer.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2009) (providing office
locations and telephone numbers).
80. Commonly Asked Questions, supra note 76.
81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 825(a)(1) (West 2009).
82. Interview with Level III Attorney, supra note 56.
83. Id.
84. See infra notes 105 and 106 and accompanying text.
85. The Commentary to NAC Standard 13.3 recommends that "all applicants
17
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Over forty years ago, the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice observed:
Early provision of counsel is equally important for discovering
facts bearing upon the ultimate disposition of the case .... In many
cases investigation can be effective only if it is begun very soon
after the criminal event. Persons at the scene may then recall the
presence of other persons and characteristics identifying them
which might otherwise soon be forgotten. Locating witnesses
requires an immediate beginning, particularly in areas where the
population is highly mobile. A defense attorney who enters the case
early can make that beginning himself, or he can direct the police or
investigating authorities toward exculpatory information.
86
The fact that the LACPD offices are generally located inside
courthouses rather than out in the community means that clients are
probably less apt to reach out for assistance prior to court appointment
of a public defender.
VII. THE WORKLOAD ISSUE
The LACPD system benefits from an advantage not shared by big
city indigent defense programs in most other states-it is empowered
to deploy an escape valve when its workload grows to the point where
for defender services, whether in or out of custody, should be able to apply directly
to the public defender . . . for representation. They also should have the right to an
immediate interview, at which time all necessary legal, investigative and other
assistance should be furnished." NAC, supra note 47, at 259. In addition, Standard
13.4 provides: "An attorney also should be provided to represent: an indigent inmate
of any detention facility at any proceeding affecting his detention or early
release..." Id. at 261. The National Study Commission's Guideline 1.2
recommends the following:
Effective representation should be available for every eligible person as
soon as: (a) the person is arrested or detained, or (b) the person reasonably
believes that a process will commence which might result in a loss of
liberty or the imposition of a legal disability of a criminal or punitive
nature, whichever occurs earliest.
NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 501.
86. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, TASK FORCE ON ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
53 (1967).
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effective representation becomes impossible. California law provides
that a public defender agency may declare that the agency is
"unavailable." 87 By statute, cases where "unavailability" is declared
must be assigned to another public defender agency or to a panel of
attorneys. 8
8
Rather than assign excess cases to the Alternate Public Defender
agency that handles conflict-of-interest cases, L.A. County superior
court judges typically assign them to the L.A. County Bar
Association's Indigent Criminal Defense Association.8 9 This group,
which consists of attorneys in private practice, ultimately winds up
handling approximately 10% of the county's indigent criminal
caseload. 90
Despite the statutory escape valve, the LACPD's ability to
manage workloads by declaring unavailability is limited. In response
to budgetary cutbacks in 1995 through 1996 that occurred
simultaneously with an increase in workload due to a new "three
strikes" law, 91 LACPD issued a written "Protocol for Declaration of
Unavailability"92  to formalize its procedures for declaring
unavailability. The LACPD then provided copies of the Protocol to
members of the judiciary. According to the Protocol, it is the
87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.2(e) (West 2008).
88. Id.
89. Kalunian, Aug. 21, 2007 Interview, supra note 11.
90. Id; see also Los Angeles County Bar Association, Indigent Criminal
Defense Appointments Program, http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm?pageid=24
(last visited Feb. 5, 2009). This panel of L.A. County Bar Association members
contracts with the L.A. County Board of Supervisors to represent indigent criminal
defendants in the superior courts when the Public Defender is unavailable.
Participating attorneys are designated as misdemeanor and felony grades I through
V, depending on their qualifications and experience. Id.
91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a)(6)(7) (West 2004).
92. Memorandum from Michael P. Judge to All Staff, Protocol for Declaration
of Unavailability of Public Defender (Aug. 29, 1995) (on file with author). The
Protocol states that, at the end of the year, LACPD calculates the "Cost of
Unavailables" and requests additional staff positions, showing a potential cost
savings to the County for the proposed additional deputies in comparison to
delegation of assignments to the Indigent Criminal Defense Association. Id.
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responsibility of Department Heads to determine when lawyers in a
given department are overloaded.93
The Protocol contains the proviso that unavailability will not be
declared in felony cases unless unusual circumstances exist. 94 Where
Department Heads determine that excessive workloads exist in felony
cases, they generally shift attorneys from misdemeanor to felony
calendars. 95 In that way, the LACPD's declarations of unavailability
most often occur in misdemeanor calendars. The Protocol has limited
utility for controlling the caseloads of attorneys handling
misdemeanor cases, however, because it defines unavailability in
misdemeanors based on caseloads that far exceed nationally
recommended levels. 96
Various external events may trigger the rare use of the Protocol in
felony matters. For example, a surge in the defenders' workload
occurred as a result of a 2006 initiative, "Jessica's Law,'97 which
tightened the criteria for indefinite commitment of sexually violent
predators. Due to the added burden on the LACPD office, the Chief
Public Defender declared unavailability of some felony attorneys. 98
National policy-making bodies have struggled to define
appropriate maximum caseload levels for public defenders. One such
body, the "Peterson Commission," also known as the National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,
recommended that a single attorney handle no more than 150 felony
cases or 400 misdemeanor cases per annum.99 These workload
93. Id. at 2.
94. Id. at 1.
95. Id. The Protocol provides: "Each attorney position deficit will result in no
more than 1,500 declarations of unavailability in new misdemeanor case filings,
calculated on an annual basis." In other words, the Protocol assumes that an
individual lawyer is capable of handling up to 1,500 misdemeanors per annum. Id. at
2.
96. Id.
97. Jessica's Law was passed by California voters in the November 2006
election as Proposition 83. See Proposed Text of Proposition 83, reprinted in Cal.
Sec'y of State, Official Voter Information Guide 127-38 (2006), available at
http://vote2006.sos.ca.gov/voterguide/pdf/English.pdf.
98. Kalunian, Aug. 2, 2007 Telephone Interview, supra note 27.
99. NAC, supra note 47, at 276.
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standards were recently reaffirmed, with some refinements, by the
American Council of Chief Defenders (ACCD).1 00
The L.A. County system exceeds the recommended maximum in
felony cases. 1°' Felony attorneys average 180 cases annually, which is
moderately higher than national standards.'o 2
Of greater concern are the LACPD's figures for misdemeanor
cases. LACPD misdemeanor attorneys dispose of 1,200 cases per
attorney per year, about three times the recommended national
maximum. 103 It should be noted that the 1,200 figure includes traffic
cases, but does not include non-jailable infractions. The ACCD
recommends that traffic misdemeanors punishable by incarceration be
included in the 400-case limit, while non-jailable traffic
misdemeanors should be excluded. 104
In-court observation supports the conclusion that LACPD's
misdemeanor caseload is grossly excessive, although some of the
problems witnessed appear to reside in the larger criminal justice
system. For example, while approximately twenty cities in L.A.
County have their own arraignment court, those arrested elsewhere in
the county must be bussed to Los Angeles for arraignment from lock-
ups in outlying areas. As a result, sheriff s and courtroom personnel in
the L.A. misdemeanor arraignment court expend seemingly endless
hours sitting by idly waiting for court sessions to begin.
Only after their arrival at misdemeanor arraignment court do
detainees have the opportunity to speak with counsel for the first time.
Police reports are transported along with detainees, so that public
defenders must await the arrival of their prospective clients before
viewing the evidence. Court sessions do not commence until after
prosecutors file their complaints and confer with defense counsel.
100. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS, STATEMENT ON CASELOADS
AND WORKLOADS (2007), http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1189179200.71/
EDITEDFINALVERSIONACCDCASELOADSTATEMENTsept6.pdf.
101. See Internal Statistics Memo, supra note 23 (comparing the cost of legal
representation between the public defender and Indigent Criminal Defense
Appointments (ICDA) for 2005-2006).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS, supra note 100, at 1 n.1.
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The majority of misdemeanor cases are disposed of by guilty
pleas at arraignment.10 5 Since detainees generally meet their public
defenders only a few moments before appearing before the judge,
many guilty pleas take place without any investigation into the facts or
the opportunity for a full-scale interview. 0 6 Courtroom proceedings,
for the most part, consist of a judge's reading from a plea agreement
discussed between the public defender and the defendant in the back
room, and signed by the defendant. Terms of the plea agreement
generally include a fee representing recoupment of a portion of the
cost of providing public defender services.
One possible justification for tolerating the existing system is that
defendants can ask for their record of conviction to be expunged. 107
However, with the exception of juvenile cases, the expungement
system in California is largely illusory. While a defendant may, under
certain circumstances, subsequently withdraw the guilty plea and ask
to have it set aside, arrest records and police reports remain in the
system. The conviction resulting from the guilty plea may still be used
to increase the defendant's sentence in the event of any future
conviction.
The processing of L.A. citizens in misdemeanor arraignment court
is nothing short of Orwellian. 10 8 Detainees are brought into the
courtroom in groups, shackled together in pairs at the wrist, and held
in a cage-like enclosure off to one side of the courtroom during the
proceedings. Unlike persons accused of felonies, who are allowed to
sit at counsel tables next to their attorneys in proximity to the judge,
misdemeanor detainees are kept in the "box," and must communicate
105. Kalunian, Aug. 21, 2007 Interview, supra note 11.
106. Under California law, when defendants represented by public defenders
wish to plead guilty, defenders are required to fully investigate all defenses of fact
and law, and then discuss these defenses with clients before allowing them to plead
guilty. People v. Mattson, 336 P.2d 937, 947-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
107. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.4-1203.4a. (West 2004 & Supp. 2009).
108. See Geoffrey Nunberg, Simpler Terms; If It's 'Orwellian,' It's Probably
Not, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2003, § 4, at 5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/06/22/weekinreview/simpler-terms-if-it-s-orwellian-it-s-probablynot.html ?scp
=I &sq=Nunberg%200rwellian&st=cse (describing how the adjective "Orwellian"
is perceived); Joseph B. Frazier, Animal Law Still in its Infancy, but Growing:
Experts, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 17, 2009, at 24 (describing an "Orwellian"
situation).
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with the judge through slats. The author witnessed a group of African
American women paraded into the box in groups of six, each shackled
to a partner. In order to rise and approach the slats when her case was
called, each woman was dependent upon the willingness, or
unwillingness, of her partner to rise and take a few steps. Each woman
signed a plea agreement, clumsily juggling papers between her free
hand and her shackled hand. Those whose right hands were shackled
had to sign with their left hands.
The confusion apparent in the L.A. misdemeanor arraignment
court is illustrative of an assembly line type of justice. On one
occasion, a male defendant stood in the box, straining to hear the
judge, who spoke in a soft voice. The defendant called out, "I can't
hear you. I don't know what's going on!" A second defendant, a
female, was informed that her bail would be $10,000, whereupon she
changed her plea to guilty so that she could be released. In the latter
case, California's bail bond system and the defendant's poverty
determined the outcome. 0 9 Under California's bail bondsman system,
if a bondsman posts a $10,000 bond, the defendant must pay the
bondsman a $1,000 nonrefundable fee.'10
On another occasion, a Hispanic male complained to the author
about public defender services delivered in defending him on a ten-
count DUI case heard in an L.A. traffic court. At the first court
appearance, a Deputy Public Defender promised to investigate his
case. Thereafter, the LACPD lost his file. He was obliged to return to
court repeatedly, about a dozen times over the course of a year,
because the public defenders were unable to locate his file. Each time,
109. The New York Times reported that "four states-Illinois, Kentucky,
Oregon and Wisconsin-have abolished commercial bail bonds, relying instead on
systems that require deposits to courts instead of payments to private businesses, or
that simply trust defendants to return for trial." Adam Liptak, Illegal Globally, Bail
for Profit Remains in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/01/29/us/29bail.html. The report concluded that: 'The flaw in the system most
often cited by critics is that defendants who have not been convicted of a crime and
who turn up for every court appearance are nonetheless required to pay a
nonrefundable fee to a private business, assuming they do not want to remain in
jail." Id. The ABA has stated that the bail bondsman system discriminates against
poor and middle-class defendants, does nothing for public safety, and usurps
decisions that ought to be made by the justice system. Id.
110. See Kalunian, Nov. 21, 2006 Interview, supra note 11.
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a different lawyer appeared on his behalf, and his case was never
investigated. The amount of time spent in attending repeated court
appearances cost him his job. He was highly dissatisfied with the
public defenders who had represented him in court, and believed he
would have fared better without their assistance. While this may be an
isolated case, the fact that it occurred at all raises questions about the
adequacy of representation by the LACPD in misdemeanor cases.
Returning to the discussion of LACPD's declaration of
"unavailability," a controversy rages at the national level regarding the
procedures that should be followed when defenders find themselves
handling excessive caseloads. The ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct require that attorneys "provide competent representation."'11
Addressing the subject of case overload in defender offices, the
ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
issued a Formal Opinion 112 interpreting the Model Rules. The Opinion
stated, "[t]he [Model] Rules [of Professional Conduct] provide no
exception for lawyers who represent indigent persons charged with
crimes., 113
The Standing Committee's Opinion goes on to address an
individual lawyer's responsibility in a large defender office where
supervisors allocate the cases. The Opinion has engendered
controversy among defender offices because it recommends a two-
step process for individual staff attorneys who believe that their
caseload has become excessive. First, the attorney must consult with
111. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2006). In addition, the ABA
House of Delegates adopted a set of Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery
System in 2002. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM (2002),
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/resolutionl07.
pdf. One such principle provides, "Defense counsel's workload is controlled to
permit the rendering of quality representation." Id. at 2. The Commentary to this
principle states: "Counsel's workload, including appointed and other work, should
never be so large as to interfere with the rendering of quality representation or lead
to the breach of ethical obligations, and counsel is obligated to decline appointments
above such levels. National caseload standards should in no event be exceeded. ..
Id.
112. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op.
06-441 (2006).
113. Id. at3.
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an immediate supervisor and advance up the chain of command within
the office to seek a "reasonable resolution" of the problem.1 1 4 If that
fails, step two recommends going over the head of the Chief Defender
to the agency's governing board or filing a motion to withdraw in the
trial court.' 15
Chief Defender Michael Judge believes that giving an individual
Deputy Defender the right to decline additional cases would be a
mistake. He complained in a letter to the ABA that such a policy
"could easily make Public Defender offices unmanageable ... [by
substituting] the judgment of a rookie lawyer, lacking experience and
perspective, for the discretion exercised by my attorney managers and
me."'116
Five of the thirty-eight branch offices of the LACPD replied to the
survey conducted by the California Criminal Defense Study in 2006-
2007.'17 Four of the five replied that excessive attorney workloads in
the office were a significant or serious problem.1' 8 A related problem
emphasized by respondents was judicial pressure to expedite cases.' 19
Other obstacles to providing effective representation cited by
respondents included withholding of Brady evidence 12° and lack of
prompt discovery by the District Attorney, difficulty in securing court
approval to retain the assistance of experts, and excessive workloads
for investigative staff members. 121
114. Id. at 5-6.
115. Id. at6.
116. Norman Lefstein & Georgia Vagenas, Restraining Excessive Defender
Caseloads: The ABA Ethics Committee Requires Action, THE CHAMPION, Dec. 2006,
at 14, available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/downloads
/ABA-ethicsplO-22.pdf; see also Michael P. Judge, A Different View of Excessive
Defender Caseload Issues (Informal Opinion), THE CHAMPION, Mar. 2007, at 50,
available at http://www.nacdl.org/_-852566CF0070A126.nsf/0/5D2BD4551DF33C
D4852572B90069BC40?Open.
117. See generally Benner, supra note 4 (results to survey on file with
Laurence A. Benner).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See text accompanying note 49.
121. See generally Benner, supra note 4.
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Unfortunately, chief defenders are often faced with a no-win
situation. During the past thirty-five years, a number of large public
defender programs have sued their governmental funding agencies,
seeking to force them to provide additional funding. 122 The lawsuits
122. See, e.g., NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 419-23. Part
VI discusses such cases as Ligda v. Superior Court of Solano County, 85 Cal. Rptr.
744 (Ct. App. 1970); Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (citing the
District Court Order including Preliminary Injunction); Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d
712 (5th Cir. 1974); and Noe v. County of Lake, 468 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ind. 1978)
(citing the District Court order). Id.
A civil rights action was filed by a Public Defender of Santa Clara County,
California, who was dismissed from his position in December 1986 after
complaining in a public budget hearing that his office was so understaffed that it
could not fulfill its constitutional obligation to defend indigent defendants, and
therefore was at risk of being sued for legal malpractice. See National Equal Justice
Library, Sheldon Portman Finding Aid, http://www.equaljusticelibrary.org/library/
findPortman.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
More recently, a series of lawsuits have been filed by or on behalf of public
defenders in other jurisdictions, with varying results. Two California counties are
among them. In Orange County, a Public Defender sued his own agency claiming
excessive caseloads. See Rachanee Srisavasdi, Deputy Defender Sues Own Office: A
County Lawyer Alleges Reprisal for Remarks About Caseloads and Discrimination,
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Jan. 10, 2007, http://
www. ocregister.com/ocregister/homepage/abox/article_1541233.php. A former
Santa Barbara County Public Defender wound up suing the County CEO in the
wake of a series of confrontations. The Public Defender claimed that he was
"constructively terminated" after unsuccessfully pushing for better working
conditions for himself and his employees. See Tom Schultz, Former Public
Defender Sues County CEO, Firestone Responds, SANTA BARBARA NEWSROOM,
May 25, 2007, http://www.santabarbaranewsroom.com/news/govenment--politics/
former-public-defender-sues-county-ceo-firestone-responds.html.
In Baton Rouge, Louisiana, a class-action lawsuit filed against Governor Kathleen
Blanco in 2004 claimed that the Calcasieu Parish Public Defender's office was
drastically underfinanced and that the accused were being denied their constitutional
right to counsel. See Laura Maggi, Public Defenders Swamped Suit Says, THE
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 24, 2004, http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/
DefenseUpdates/Louisiana034.
Excessive caseloads led to a lawsuit by the Miami, Florida-Dade County Public
Defender, and other Florida public defenders have been considering filing suit. See
Liza Park, Public Defender's Plight, WCTV, Nov. 13, 2008,
http://www.wctv.tv/home/headlines/34377639.html.
A lawsuit filed by the statewide Kentucky defender agency against the State of
Kentucky in 2008 achieved some positive results. After the agency claimed that it
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alleged that the agencies' excessive caseloads violated constitutional
mandates to provide effective assistance of counsel.1 23 In most of
these instances, the chief defenders were summarily fired as a result of
their advocacy. The case overload escape valve contained in
California law is a positive development, but due to numerical
constraints, it fails to resolve the problems presented by huge numbers
of arrests flooding the system. As we have seen in L.A. County, the
problems posed by excessive caseloads are most evident in
misdemeanor cases.
did not have enough money to adequately represent its clients, Kentucky's General
Assembly approved a new funding bill. See Sarah Kelley, Broke Justice, LEO
WEEKLY, Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.leoweekly.com/news/broke-justice.
A satisfactory settlement agreement was achieved as a result of a class action
lawsuit filed by the ACLU and Columbia, Washington, Legal Services in 2004. The
agreement led to significantly lower caseload assignments for Grant County's public
defender system. The county agreed to assign no more than 150 felony cases per
year to each of its six contracted public defenders in superior court as a result of the
lawsuit. See David Cole, Public Defense System Improving, Report Says, COLUMBIA
BASIN HERALD, Jul. 21, 2006, http://www.columbiabasin
herald.com/articles/2006/07/21/news/news02.txt.
In 1998, the ACLU achieved a stunningly successful settlement in a class action
lawsuit against Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, for failing to provide adequate
counsel to its indigent defendants. Under the historic settlement, the public
defender's office was slated to double in size over a three-and-a-half-year period.
See Press Release, ACLU, Settlement in Class-Action Lawsuit Against Pittsburgh
Public Defender for Failing to Counsel the Poor (May 13, 1998), http://clearing
house.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/PD-PA-0001-0004.pdf.
The following year, the ACLU also reached a successful settlement in a class-action
lawsuit against the State of Connecticut for failing to provide the public defender
system with adequate funding. See Press Release, ACLU, Settlement Reached in
ACLU's Class-Action Lawsuit Alleging Inadequacy of CT Public Defender System,
(Jul. 7, 1999), http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/gen/10138prs1999 0707.html.
In 2007, the National Law Journal reported that the Michigan Coalition for Justice
had filed a lawsuit against the state alleging that it had not spent enough money to
allow defendants their constitutional right to counsel. A spokesperson for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers commented that she was hopeful
that this and other lawsuits "may finally lead to some results." See Vesna Jaksic,
Public Defenders, Prosecutors Face a Crisis in Funding, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 27,
2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/careercenter/lawArticleCareer
Center.jsp?id=I 174912590486. These are but a sample of instances where chief
defenders have sought aid from the courts in controlling excessive caseloads.
123. Id.
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VIII. TRAINING OF NEW ATTORNEYS
The administration of the LACPD reported that most new recruits
to the public defender office are hired right out of law school. 2 4 Yet,
the agency provides no formal training programs for new attorneys
outside of an orientation lasting two to three days. 25 The State Bar's
standards mandate entry-level training for all public defenders unless
an attorney's prior experience merits an exception. The standards
specify a minimum of twenty-one hours of classes for indigent
defense providers in their first year of practice.1 26
New recruits are plunged into courtroom duty almost
immediately. According to the Chief Deputy Defender, "We start
them out in preliminary hearing court [for felonies] because they can
do the least harm there, since the standard of proof is so low, most
people will be bound over, regardless." 127 Next, the new lawyers
124. Kalunian, Nov. 21, 2006 Interview, supra note 13 ("Most of our lawyers
are hired right after graduation. We like to get them right out of law school before
they can develop any bad habits and train them ourselves.").
125. Id.
126. CALIFORNIA STATE BAR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 18. The
Commentary to NAC Standard 13.16 states: "Systematic and intensive basic training
programs for new defenders are imperative in order to provide even the minimum
degree of specialized skill necessary to adequate criminal defense representation."
NAC, supra note 47, at 285. The Commentary to the National Study Commission's
Guideline 5.7 states:
An ideal entry-level training program consists of a four-to-six week
curriculum during which time trainees are not assigned to courts or to
cases. Instruction should include lectures, seminars and reading
assignments covering statutory and case law materials on practice and
procedures .... New attorneys should be involved in simulated client and
witness interviews and simulated trial situations. Role playing exercises
should be videotaped and discussed.
NATIONAL STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 12.
127. Kalunian, Nov. 21, 2006 Interview, supra note 13; see also Michael P.
Judge, Pub. Defender, L.A. County, Presentation Before the Citizens' Economy
Efficiency Commission: State of the Public Defender's Office (Feb. 7, 2002),
available at http://eec.co.la.ca.us/monthly-activities/presentations/html/pres0202
a.asp ("'Rookies' move through felony preliminary hearings, general misdemeanor
trials, and 'driving under the influence' trials." According to Judge, the "trainee"
during that time period "has accessibility to a trainer, a lawyer, and a mentor.").
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progress to handling misdemeanor arraignments. Afterwards, they will
be assigned to a misdemeanor calendar. The primary concession
accorded to inexperienced lawyers is a somewhat reduced caseload.
Some direct supervision of attorney performance is provided by
supervisory attorneys, who may observe new recruits in the
courtroom. Surprisingly, the agency has no training division, although
the head of appeals supervises whatever training is provided.128
IX. CONCLUSION
The benefits of employing a large institutional public defender
agency such as the LACPD, with its highly experienced, full-time
criminal law specialists, are substantial. An organized defender system
that is comparable in scope to the District Attorney's office keeps the
criminal justice system in balance by providing the necessary
counterweight to overzealous prosecution tactics. In addition, the
LACPD's special projects provide an invaluable societal service by
funneling the mentally ill and others with medical needs into treatment
programs that protect society while providing rehabilitation for the
criminally accused.
On the other hand, the low priority placed by the LACPD agency
on the handling of misdemeanor matters has serious adverse effects.
First and foremost, some inadequately counseled, but innocent
defendants, may acquire a criminal record by pleading guilty to a
minor charge simply to gain release from custody. It appears that
LACPD's misdemeanor clients fail to receive the benefit of
investigation into defenses of fact and law promised to them under
California court decisions. Secondly, as the President's Commission
recognized so long ago, the public's perception of fairness in the
criminal justice system is damaged by "assembly line justice" in the
lower courts where millions of citizens have their first encounter with
128. Kalunian, Nov. 21, 2006 Interview, supra note 13. Kalunian stated that
new attorneys are "under close supervision," and that the head of appeals is in
charge of training. Id. However, no supervisors were present in the courtroom when
the author observed a preliminary hearing courtroom handled by "pool" attorneys on
November 21, 2006. The LACPD's Internal Statistical Memo for 2007 describes
"new lawyer training" as "on the job training." Internal Statistics Memo, supra note
23.
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a system that affords inadequate attention to the individual
defendant. 29 It is misdemeanor cases that are most visible to the
public, yet that is where the Public Defender places the agency's
weakest lawyers.
Additional resources are needed to remedy this problem.
Consideration might be given to offering defendants in misdemeanor
cases a "choice of counsel" by allowing them to opt for representation
by a member of the Indigent Criminal Defense Association or by
establishing private, non-profit neighborhood legal defense offices.
This change may require a legislative amendment.
Finally, the lack of adequate training for lawyers without trial
experience is a significant gap in the L.A. defender program. A large
system like the LACPD requires an in-house formal training program
for new recruits as well as continuing legal education for experienced
lawyers. The National Institute for Trial Advocacy offers a
comprehensive training program that could serve as a model for the
agency. Establishing a dedicated "Director of Training" position in the
agency would facilitate this goal. The need to organize and maintain a
systematic training program calls for additional sources of funding. A
four-to-six week, in-house, entry-level curriculum' 30 would go a long
way toward ensuring that new hires at LACPD meet constitutional
mandates.
129. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 128 (U.S. Government
Printing Office 1967).
130. See discussion supra note 126.
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